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I. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM OUTLINE
“I love fools’ experiments. I am always making them.”

1

A. The Benefit of Comparisons
Stating that an apple is a green or red fruit and a wristwatch is not a
fruit does not convey anything about either object.
As such
comparisons are neither inherently useful nor per se justified as a
scholarly or practical endeavor. A comparative approach to U.S. patent
law has to be conducted with a suitable counterpart. “There are no less
than 42 legal systems in the world, and comparison has traditionally
focused on three major legal families . . . namely the civil law system,
2
common law system and socialist system.” Instead of comparing the
United States, a common law country, with socialist countries that are
heavily decreasing in numbers and do not provide for patent systems
that acknowledge substantial private property rights, the United States
should be compared with either European Union law in general or with
a civil law country.
Because this Article deals with an infringement issue, it should be
noted that pursuant to Article 64(3) of the European Patent Convention
even infringement of a European patent (save infringement of national
3
patents) is to be dealt with by national law. Thus, only the Member
States of the European Union are left as suitable objects for a
comparison.
From the academic point of view, the United States could be
compared to Portugal, Iceland, or Germany. Although one has to agree
with the proposition that the “[d]iscussion[] of the goals of comparative
law often draw[s] an overly sharp distinction between its practical and
4
its scientific aims,” and that the scientific benefit of each of the
comparisons above would be of equal value, a comparison with one of
the major European trade partners has to be considered the more
1.
LIFE AND LETTERS OF CHARLES DARWIN: INCLUDING AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL CHAPTER (Francis Darwin ed., 1897), reprinted in JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES, AND PROVERBS
TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN LITERATURE 445 (Justin Kaplan
ed., 18th ed. 1992) (1855).
2. PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 3 (1995).
3. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 64(3), 1065
U.N.T.S. 199, 274, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/.
4. MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A
NUTSHELL 5 (2d ed. 1999).
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practical, and thus, more useful approach.
Transatlantic patent
disputes, namely infringement suits, arise more frequently with one of
the European trading partners.
B. U.S. and German Patent Law
Although it would go well beyond the scope of this Article and may
be worthy of treatment in a thesis discussing and comparing the history
of both legal systems, a brief introductory remark on the genesis of both
patent law systems seems appropriate. Contrary to usual common law
thinking that legal principles were developed in Great Britain and later
adopted and modified by the United States, the United States conceived
of the need for patent protection sooner than Germany.
President George Washington signed the Patent Act into law as
5
early as 1790; whereas in eighteenth century Germany, a patent system
was not felt to be a pressing need, at least not by the administration of
6
the economically and politically most important state of Prussia.
According to an 1853 survey conducted by the Royal Prussian Ministry
of Trade and Commerce that was administered to the Prussian District
Governments (Bezirksregierungen) and Chambers of Trade, thirty-one
out of forty-seven of these participants voted against the
7
implementation of a patent protection scheme.
Consequently, a
8
uniform German patent act did not exist until 1877 and it was not until
9
1936 that the statute acknowledged the inventor, and not the patent
10
applicant, as the sole legitimate proprietor.
C. The Problem
With the parties to the comparison being established, the discussion
will now turn to the specific problem at issue.
It is the very dilemma of patent law, or as Professor Cornish put it,
11
the “innate conflict in the objects for which patent systems exist,” that
5. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
6. At the respective time, before the foundation of the Deutsche Reich in 1871,
Germany did not even exist as a nation, but consisted of a loose collection of small states.
7. See Wolfgang Pfaller, Das Patentgesetz von 1877,
http://www.people.freenet.de/patentgeschichte/1877.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).
8. Patentgesetz [Patent Act], May 25, 1877 RGBl. I at 501 (F.R.G.).
9. Patentgesetz [Patent Act], May 5, 1936 RGBl. II at 117 (F.R.G.).
10. See Paul Bluhm, Die Entstehung des ersten gesamtdeutschen Patentgesetzes [Genesis
of the First Uniform German Patent Act], 1952 GRUR 341, 341–46.
11. William R. Cornish, Experimental Use of Patented Inventions in European
Community States, 29 IIC 735, 735 (1998).
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lays out the background for the specific issue: striking a balance
between the “attempt to promote interest in research while at the same
time conferring the exclusivity incentive that a patent grants to the
12
inventor.”
Abstractly speaking, he who seeks to invent something new will
always build upon what his predecessors have invented. One could thus
argue that it is both logical and in the public interest to allow
experiments with a patented invention. This very abstract statement,
however, oversimplifies the problem. It does not address whether
inventors may feel discouraged from refining and elaborating on an
invention. For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, mandatory
prerequisites for marketing a new product may chill invention. In the
case of pharmaceuticals, extensive testing is required before a new
compound will be admitted to the market by the Federal Drug
Administration (FDA). With a development cost of approximately
13
$500 million for a new medicinal product, considerable economic
interests are at stake. Thus, numerous questions demand a more
thorough analysis in the quest for the adequate legal treatment of
experiments. Are pharmaceuticals a special case? Does that change the
general policy on experimenting? What is this policy? What should it
be? If privileges for experimental conduct are to be granted, what
should be deemed an experiment as opposed to plain infringement?
Safeguarding the effect of a patented invention in the “global
14
world” of today means not only being aware of domestic regulations
but also considering foreign regulations that affect patent protection
and the scope of possible defenses to infringement claims. The defense
that has been most frequently discussed and that is, at least for the
pharmaceutical industry, likely to be the crucial point of practical patent
protection is the safe harbor for experimental use, a provision that seeks
to reconcile the problem mentioned above.
Article 28(1) of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement states that a patent shall confer on its owner
the right “to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from
the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing [the]
12. Tanuja V. Garde, The Effect of Disparate Treatment of the Experimental Use
Exemption on the Balancing Act of 35 U.S.C. § 104, 35 IIC 241, 242 (2004).
13. Dr. Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Encouragement of New Clinical Drug Development:
The Role of Data Exclusivity 1 (2000),
http://www.ifpma.org/documents/NR643/DataExclusivity_2000.pdf.
14. This is, of course, strictly speaking a pleonasm, yet used here to emphasize the
increasingly intertwined and international character of business and commerce in the world.
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15

product.”
Thus, third-party activities with a patent are, generally
16
speaking, not “experiments,” but plain infringement.
As an exception to that rule, Article 30 of the TRIPS states that
“Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably . . . prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner,
17
taking into account of the legitimate interests of third parties.” The
wording suggests that Member State legislators who are willing to
address the issue have more than one option for complying with TRIPS.
D. Further Procedure of Analysis and Terminology
Speaking of “experimental use,” two basic constructions have to be
kept separate. One is experimental use as an exception to public use
18
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), and the second is experimental use as a
defense to patent infringement claims. This form of experimental use is
subdivided into common law experimental use (a controversial subject)
and statutory experimental use.
The terminology used for keeping these constructions separate is
unfortunately different depending on the authority and sometimes even
inconsistent within a single court. The Federal Circuit talks about “the
19
experimental use and de minimis exceptions,” thereby obviously
characterizing “experimental use exception” as the proper term for the
exception to the § 102(b) statutory bar and “de minimis exception” as
the proper term for the experimental use defense to patent infringement
claims. The same court also, however, uses the term “experimental use
20
exemption” for the latter characterization.
Referring to legislative
materials, the court pointed out that “[35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)] has been
coined an ‘exemption’ in the case law, drawing from terminology used in
21
the legislative history.” However, those very materials used the term
15. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197, art. 28(1) (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
16. The issue of the unfortunate terminology in the field of “experimental use” will be
addressed in Part I.D.
17. TRIPS, supra note 15, at art. 30.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
19. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
20. See, e.g., Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 n.3 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (citing Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 324 F.3d 1322, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
21. Integra, 331 F.3d at 866 n.3 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 5 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2689)).
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22

23

“exception” as does the wording of Article 30 of TRIPS. In a recent
article, the opposite terminology is suggested: “[t]he experimental use
exemption to the 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) public use . . . is distinct from the
24
experimental use exception to patent infringement.” Prior to Merck
25
KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., the U.S. Supreme Court referred,
26
like other courts, to the statutory patent infringement defense as the
27
“clinical trial exemption.” It emphasized that the exemption was by no
28
means only referring to clinical trials. An issue that will be addressed
below.
In this Article, the experimental use exception will stand for the 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) public use bar and the experimental use exemption will
stand for the statutory patent infringement defense. This is not to say
that no other terminology is possible. Alternatively, a leading treatise
on patent law describes the § 102(b) public use concept as the
29
“experimental use negation,” an expression that can also be based on
30
Federal Circuit precedent.
Strictly speaking, the statutory safe harbor should not be referred to
as the “experimental use” exception/exemption/negation at all, because
the word “experimental” does not correctly characterize the testing
activity—not to explore unknown territories, but rather to confirm the
bioequivalency of patented drugs. As the British Court of Appeal
31
stated in Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., trials carried out for
the purpose of demonstrating that “the product works as its maker
claims were not to be regarded as acts done ‘for experimental

22. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2689.
23. See TRIPS, supra note 15, at art. 30.
24. See Michelle Walters, De Minimis Use and Experimental Use Exceptions to Patent
Infringement: A Comment on the Embrex Concurrence, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 509, 510 n.1 (2001).
25. 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
26. See, e.g., Datascope Corp. v. Vascular Solutions, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 933, 935 (D.
Minn. 2001); Intermedics v. Ventritex, Co., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Ann K.
Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 and 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e)
(1994)), 180 A.L.R. FED. 487, 524 (2005).
27. Datascope Corp., 165 F. Supp. 2d at 935 (emphasis added); see also Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990).
28. Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380–81 (2005).
29. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 196 (2d
ed. 2003) (emphasis added).
30. See id. at 204–05 (citing Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1122 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
31. Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., [1985] R.P.C. 515, 1987 GRUR INT. 108
(Eng.).
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32

purposes.’”
If the U.S. Supreme Court itself had not declared the
exemption to apply beyond the clinical trials phase, the more accurate
wording would be its term, “clinical trial exemption.” Accordingly, for
reasons to be discussed in this Article, because this term is not
appropriate for the more general German provisions, this term will not
be used here. In any event, it is of little benefit to discuss these widely
semantic questions at length.
Staying with the unfortunate term “experimental use” for all
constructions requires that they all be briefly defined, even though the
public use bar is not an issue here. Thereafter, the relevant German
provisions on experimental use and its implications will be explained in
Part III, followed by a discussion of the differences and similarities
between the U.S. and German provisions in Part IV. The conclusion
will follow under Part V. A simplified chart outlining the major
differences is in the Appendix.
II. EXPERIMENTAL USE IN U.S. PATENT LAW
A. Experimental Use as an Exception to the § 102(b) Statutory Bar
Black’s Law Dictionary defines this form of “experimental-use
exception” as “an exception to the public-use statutory bar, whereby an
inventor is allowed to make public use of an invention for more than
33
one year when that use is necessary to test and improve the invention.”
As early as 1877, the U.S. Supreme Court provided a broad foundation
for experimental use in City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson
34
Pavement Co. in which it allowed an inventor of a new road pavement
to test it on the open street provided that he retained some form of
35
control. This form of experimental use is not relevant for infringement
claims and will not be pursued any further in this Article.
B. Common Law Experimental Use Exemption
The second meaning of experimental use, and the only pertinent one
for the purpose of this Article, is a special kind of de minimis
infringement defense. When talking about common law experimental
use, the first question is whether this is an existing concept at all. Judge

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 517, 1987 GRUR INT. at 110.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 619 (8th ed. 2004).
97 U.S. 126 (1877).
Id. at 135–36.
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Rader, in his often-cited concurrence in Embrex, Inc. v. Service
Engineering Corp., argued that “the Patent Act leaves no room for any
de minimis or [common law] experimental use excuses for
36
infringement.” Judge Newman, on the other hand, feared that the
Federal Circuit’s Integra opinion “disapproves and essentially eliminates
37
Despite Judge
the [existing] common law research exemption.”
Newman’s explicit concerns, this issue has not been addressed by the
38
U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling in that case.
As the following discussion will show, “common law de minimis
infringement”—assuming it does exist—is currently being examined by
U.S. courts through a highly theoretical approach. Although such an
experimental use exemption was promulgated by the judiciary as early
39
as 1813, an exception focusing on what the Federal Circuit later
described as a use performed “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity,
or for strictly philosophical inquiry” does not constitute a practically
applicable defense for the business-oriented players on the global stage
40
of intellectual property.
In simplified terms, one can say that common law requires that “one
cannot maintain an action for a wrongdoing where there is no
41
damage.” For example, when no profit ensued from a patent violation,
42
Thus, “the experimental use
there are presumably no damages.
exception does not protect experiments or tests which have a
43
commercial purpose.”
Cases in which courts allowed the alleged
44
infringer to plead such a defense are “relatively rare,” amounting to
45
“five cases in the history of the Republic.” Judge Newman argued that
36. 216 F.3d at 1352.
37. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38. Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 passim (2005).
39. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). “[I]t could
never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man who constructed such a
machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.” Id.
40. Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
41. See Garde, supra note 12, at 243.
42. See Byam v. Bullard, 4 F. Cas. 934 (C.C.D. Mass. 1852) (quoting Whittemore v.
Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813)).
43. Ares-Serono, Inc. v. Organon Int’l B.V., 862 F. Supp. 603, 608 (D. Mass. 1994).
44. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 845.
45. David Carney, Supreme Court Takes Case Involving Research Exemption to Patent
Infringement, TECH. L.J. § 7 (Jan. 7, 2005),
http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2005/20050107.asp (quoting Judge Rader from an
unpublished source).
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46

“philosophical” indeed meant “scientific” and that the wording
warrants a broader understanding. This controversy will be discussed in
Part V.
The Federal Circuit’s construction of the experimental use exception
leaves only non-commercial use, a phenomenon hardly found in
practice. Even universities cannot be presumed to be “ivory towers,”
detached and separated from profit-oriented thinking, especially after
47
the passage of the Bayh-Doyl Act. In fact, universities are very much
in the business of research, and many are generating substantial
revenues for experiments or earning considerable royalties from patents
48
in the commercial sector. The Federal Circuit has recently declined to
49
hold that university research is exempt from patent infringement.
Reaffirming Judge Newman’s concerns, one scholar observed, “[t]his
holding severely limited, to the point of near elimination, the common
50
law experimental use defense.”
This is a valid point considering that Duke University, in its writ of
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, stated that private universities
could never benefit from experimental use because all of their research
is in furtherance of their legitimate business objectives; whereas—
although absurd in the eyes of Duke University—commercial
51
enterprises could lawfully engage in simply experimental research. It
52
did not grant certiorari, demonstrating that the point made by Duke
53
University did not significantly concern the U.S. Supreme Court. That

46. As Judge Newman pointed out in her concurring in part, dissenting in part opinion
to Integra, the “philosophical” experiment refers to “natural philosophy,” which is commonly
understood as “science” today. See Garde, supra note 12, at 243 n.10.
47. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019–28 (1980) (codified as 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12
(2000)). The Act seeks “to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and
nonprofit organizations, including universities.” Id.
48. See Ted Agres, Columbia Patents under Attack, THE SCIENTIST, July 25, 2003,
available at http://www.the-scientist.com/news/20030725/03.
“Five large biotech and
pharmaceutical companies are accusing Columbia University of having illegally extended the
life of key DNA patents to maintain highly lucrative licensing revenues. The patents have
brought the university between $300 and $400 million in licensing royalties over the past 2
decades.” Id.
49. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
50. Garde, supra note 12, at 246.
51. See Brief of Petitioner at 13, Duke Univ. v. Madey, 539 U.S. 958 (2003) (No. 021007).
52. Duke Univ. v. Madey, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
53. The fact that certiorari was granted in Integra may affect this issue as well, but a
general exemption for university research as a per se non-business research is (rightfully so, in
light of the commercial nature) not warranted.
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being said, Part II.C discusses the only defensive tools reasonably
applicable to commercial use—those created by statute.
54
The German Federal Supreme Court took a similar stand in its
55
landmark opinion Clinical Tests II (Klinische Versuche II). It pointed
to the impossibility of differentiating between purely academic and
56
commercial research.
It also highlighted that, in practice,
biotechnological research will mostly be carried out by commercial
57
enterprises or universities because of high costs. It concluded that the
research efforts of the latter are also commonly driven by commercial
58
interests.
C. Statutory Experimental Use Exemption: The Hatch-Waxman Act
Yet another, and the most relevant, understanding of experimental
use is the statutory de minimis infringement provision. On September
24, 1984, President Reagan signed into law the Drug Price Competition
59
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly referred to as the
60
Hatch-Waxman Act.
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides for an abbreviated
approval process for generic forms of previously approved
pioneer drug products whose patents have or will soon expire or
are proven invalid. A pharmaceutical company seeking approval
to market a generic product must complete an Abbreviated New
Drug Application (“ANDA”). . . . The ANDA applicant may
rely upon the pioneer company’s tests. It need only prove that
the generic contains the same active ingredient as, and is
61
bioequivalent to, the patented drug.

54.
The outcome of that case was of course different, but for other reasons discussed
in Part III.C.
55. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Apr. 17, 1997, 1997 NJW
3092, [1998] R.P.C. 423 (F.R.G.).
56. Id. at 3095, [1998] R.P.C. at 433.
57. Id., [1998] R.P.C. at 437.
58. Id., [1998] R.P.C. at 437–38.
59. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984). For a detailed discussion of all aspects of this statute, see Wooster, supra
note 26, at 487.
60. The commonly referred to name of the Act refers to its co-sponsors, Senator Orrin
Hatch (R-UT) and Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA).
61. See Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 98-1661, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22567
at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 1996).
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62

The Act provided the first and only specific research-use exemption
in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which provides as follows:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United
States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or
veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4,
1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA,
recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes
involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
63
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.
“Under a literal interpretation of patent law, it is clear that ‘research
64
exemption’-type of activities are literal infringements . . . .” Congress
explicitly exempted certain infringing activities from the scope of the
patent protection for policy considerations.
65
As Judge Nies observed in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
“section 271(e)(1) was added to overrule this court’s decision in
66
67
Roche.” In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co., the
Federal Circuit held that experimental use did not encompass the use of
a patented compound for federally mandated pre-marketing tests even
if the new drug (here, the one marketed by Bolar) would not enter the
68
market prior to patent expiration. The legislature agreed with the
pharmaceutical company’s argument that patents will, under the Roche
rule, be de facto extended if competitors must wait on mandatory
69
bioequivalency tests until the patents expire.

62. “Only” refers to the “only one applicable in the context of patents.” Id. There is
another statutory research exemption that deals with the use and reproduction of protected
plant varieties. See 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2000). Section 2544 provides that “[t]he use and
reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not
constitute an infringement of the protection provided under this Act.” Id.
63. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
64. Lauren C. Bruzzone, The Research Exemption: A Proposal, 21 AIPLA Q. J. 52, 54
(1993).
65. 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’d, 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
66. Id. at 406.
67. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 860–61.
69. For a more detailed analysis of the underlying policy considerations, see Bruzzone,
supra note 64, at 54.
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D. Scope of Experimental Use Provision
In the United States, courts have generally conceded that the use of
a patented invention solely to develop generic drugs for purposes of
70
FDA approval does not constitute infringement. However, this very
broad statement does not help in comparing U.S. and German
provisions; instead, it compels a closer look at the statutory language.
Both legislative concepts provide a safe harbor from infringement if
the experiment “relates” (or “reasonably relates” under U.S. law) to
admission of a compound under U.S. law or the patented subject matter
itself under German law. Needless to say, this “relationship” is open to
interpretation as to when infringement is considered “reasonable.”
The most commonly applied test is whether a reasonable defendant
would have believed that there was “a decent prospect that the use in
question would contribute to the generation of the kind of information
that was likely to be relevant in the processes by which the FDA would
71
decide whether to approve the product.” That does not, however,
answer the question, because it is unclear what information a party may
believe to be relevant and what information it may not believe to be
relevant.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California took
a very narrow approach in Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v.
72
Gentech, Inc., holding that experimental use was limited to
bioequivalency tests for FDA approval and, thus, did not, as the
defendant asserted, cover all uses “reasonably related to FDA testing,”
but only use solely related to obtaining data for bioequivalency testing
73
mandated by FDA rules.
This approach finds support among some scholars:
On its face, the [U.S.] exemption appears to be very broad,
applying to a wide range of potential infringers and activities.
The legislative history, however, indicates that Congress was
concerned with a very narrow class of infringers and range of
activities. Specifically, the legislative history indicates that the

70. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 534 (D.N.J. 2002),
aff’d on other grounds, 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
71. See Wooster, supra note 26, at 525 (citing In re ‘639 Patent Litigation, 154 F. Supp.
2d 157 (D. Mass. 2001)).
72. 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
73. Id. at 1396.
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exception was only meant to protect bioequivalency testing by
74
generic manufacturers.
One can well argue whether this holding went beyond the intention
of Congress, because the statute explicitly states that the exemption
shall apply to “solely all uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
75
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”
That was exactly what the
defendant asked the court to hold.
This viewpoint, in the eyes of the author, cannot be rebutted merely
by asserting the legislative intent and invoking the general principle that
76
experimental use be construed “very narrowly.” As the U.S. Supreme
Court held, “[i]t is not the law that a statute can have no effects which
77
are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history.” Congressional
intent, thus, does not necessarily limit a statute to its language.
A limitation to bioequivalency testing for FDA approval does seem
unwarranted by law. Congress would have chosen a different wording if
it meant to narrow the statute in this way. The wording of § 271(e)(1),
especially by stressing “all uses” and “development and submission,”
suggests that the Northern District of California somehow went beyond
Congress’ intent. As the U.S. Supreme Court established, courts cannot
generally override the statutory wording if it is clear: “[A judge’s]
inquiry must cease if . . . ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and
78
consistent.’” However, that might not exactly be the case. The statute
79
is, in the words of Judge Nies, “fraught with ambiguity.” That question
does not need to be pursued in depth though, because the Northern
District of California reverted to the more commonly used standards in
Intermedics, stating that the applicable test was whether the defendant
could reasonably believe in a “decent prospect” of its conduct to
80
generate information relevant for FDA approval. In the same opinion,

74. William S. Feiler & Paula K. Wittmayer, Protecting Research to Develop Drugs, 229
N.Y. L.J. 9 (2003).
75. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
76. See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing
Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
77. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronics, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 n.2 (1990) (quoting Pittston
Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988)).
78. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ron
Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).
79. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 405 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’d, 496 U.S.
661 (1990).
80. See Intermedics v. Ventritex, Co., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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the court held that the experimental use exemption also applied to
81
medical devices.
The Federal Circuit’s latest statements on experimental use are to be
82
found in the recently vacated Integra opinion. Integra held a patent for
a certain polypeptide sequence; Merck used this compound for research
83
purposes. Merck asserted § 271(e)(1) as a defense because it was using
the drug to search for new drugs that would be subject to FDA
84
approval. The Federal Circuit held that Merck was not eligible for the
§ 271(e)(1) defense because “general biomedical research aimed
85
towards identifying new compounds” was not what Congress
warranted by creating a safe harbor for generic drugs. In the words of
Judge Rader, “§ 271(e)(1) simply does not globally embrace all
experimental activity that at some point, however attenuated, may lead
86
to an [sic] FDA approval process.”
Basic scientific research on a particular compound, performed
without the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable
belief that the compound will cause the sort of physiological
effect the researcher intends to induce, is surely not reasonably
related to the development and submission of information to the
87
FDA.
However, the court voted for a broader understanding of the HatchWaxman Act: “It does not follow from this, however, that the §
271(e)(1)’s exemption from infringement categorically excludes either
(1) experimentation on drugs that are not ultimately the subject of an
FDA submission or (2) use of patented compounds in experiments that
88
are not ultimately submitted to the FDA.” Thus, it did not only come
out on the side of Merck but also sided with the U.S. government. The
acting Solicitor General, along with several other government leaders,
89
filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the United States expressing
discomfort with the holding of the Federal Circuit and arguing that the
decision “will likely hinder the development of important and medically

81. Id. at 1272.
82. Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 passim (2005).
83. Id. at 2377–78.
84. Id. at 2378–79.
85. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
86. Id. at 867.
87. Merck KGAA, 125 S. Ct. at 2382 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id.
89. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20, Merck
KGAA v. Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237).
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90

valuable new drugs.”
Section 271(e)(1), as construed by the U.S.
Supreme Court, leaves “simply no room . . . for excluding certain
information from the exemption on the basis of the phase of research in
which it is developed or the particular submission in which it could be
91
included.”
The U.S. Supreme Court’s construction of § 271(e)(1) is, as the
following explanations will show, closer to the German understanding
than the Federal Circuit’s opinion.
III. EXPERIMENTAL USE IN GERMAN PATENT LAW
German patent law provides for general protection of the
patent/patentee in a similar way the protection works in U.S. law;
however, as a civil law country, these protections are provided solely
92
through statutes. Sections 9 and 10 of the German Patent Act (PatG)
93
are entitled “Effect of the Patent” (“Wirkung des Patents”). Section 9
prohibits direct use by third parties and § 10 prohibits indirect use by
94
third parties. Similar to U.S. patent law, third parties are not only
restricted from using the patented product, but are also restricted from
producing, offering for sale, or placing into commerce a product that
95
falls within the scope of the patented subject matter. Exemptions are
now set out in § 11, which is expressively entitled “Restrictions of the
96
Effect of the Patent” (“Beschränkung der Wirkung des Patents”).
A. The 1968 Patent Act
Before experimental use was explicitly covered in the 1981 PatG, § 6
97
of the statutory predecessor, the 1968 PatG, contained a rather
ambiguous wording construed by most authorities in a way to allow
experimental conduct as long as the experiment constituted an action in
90. Carney, supra note 45, at 2.
91. Merck KGAA, 125 S. Ct. at 2380.
92. For the sake of consistency, the symbol “§” is used for both U.S. and German
codifications although—widely unknown even among scholars—it does not mean “section,”
but “paragraph” throughout Europe. However, in Europe, a paragraph is not the subelement of a section, but vice versa; thus, using the sign as opposed to the more commonly
pursued approach of omitting the sign in international documents and using the word
“section” is preferable. Accordingly, “§ 9 PatG” would be referred to by any European
lawyer as “paragraph 9,” but has the meaning of “section 9” in the U.S. law context.
93. Patentgesetz [Patent Act], Dec. 18, 1980, BGBl. I, §§ 9, 10 (F.R.G.).
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Id. § 11.
97. Patentgesetz [Patent Act], Jan. 2, 1968, BGBl. I, § 6 (F.R.G.).
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the private sphere without further commercial motivation. This did not
allow economic use of the invention, but restricted tests to acts of
private use, that is, verification that the patented invention was working
99
properly and pure laboratory testing.
The German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) held in
100
Ethofumesat that third party use constituted an infringement when the
third parties used an herbicide product containing the patented active
substance in field tests during the term of the patent to explore whether
the substance was effective, not injurious to human health, and
101
environmentally friendly.
According to the German Federal Court’s construction of the 1968
PatG, which still applied to that particular case, such experiments were
exempt if the sole purpose was to improve the invention. Because the
experiments in question served to obtain data necessary to ensure
compliance with the Federal Agency for Drugs and Pharmaceuticals
102
(BfAPharm) approval procedure and not to improve the invention,
this conduct was not covered by the experimental use exemption. A
leading commentary on the PatG stated that only scientific experiments
103
were admissible —an opinion not upheld in later editions after the
104
modification of the 1981 PatG.
98. “[E]ine Handlung im privaten Bereich ohne weitergehende ‘gewerbliche Zwecke.’”
Peter Chrocziel, Zulassungshandlungen mit patentierten Arzneimittelerfindungen durch
Zweitanmelder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den USA [Admission Activities with
Patented Drug Inventions by Second Applicants in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the
U.S.], 1984 GRUR INT. 735, 738.
99. See Ingve B. Stjerna, Die Voraussetzungen und Grenzen des patentrechtlichen
Versuchsprivilegs [Preconditions and Borders of the Experimental Use Exemption in Patent
Law], 2004 GRUR 343, 344 (referencing applicable case law); Thomas Hieber, Die
Zulaessigkeit von Versuchen an patentierten Erfindungen nach § 11 Nr. 2 PatG [Admissibility
of Experiments with Patented Inventions Pursuant to § 11(2) of the Patent Act], 1996 GRUR
439, 440.
100. Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court], Feb. 18, 1992, 107
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 46 (F.R.G.), 1990 GRUR
997.
101. Id.
102. Federal Agency for Drugs and Pharmaceuticals (Bundesanstalt für Arzneimittel
und Pharmaprodukte) is the German equivalent of the United States’ Food and Drug
Administration (but only supervising medicinal products). There is also the Federal Health
Agency (Bundesgesundheitsamt) with its own expertise.
103. Georg Benkard, Annotation, Patentgesetz und Gebrauchsmustergesetz [Patent Act
and Design Patent Act], Patentgesetz [Patent Act], Dec. 18, 1980, BGBl. I, §§ 9, 10 (F.R.G.)
(as amended by Law of Dec. 20, 1991) (argument upheld until 7th ed.).
104. See Georg Benkard, Annotation, Patentgesetz und Gebrauchsmustergesetz [Patent
Act and Design Patent Act], Patentgesetz [Patent Act], Dec. 18, 1980, BGBl. I, §§ 9, 10
(F.R.G.) (as amended by Law of Mar. 23, 1993) (argument upheld until 9th ed.).
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B. The 1981 Patent Act
The reason for including an explicit experimental use exemption in
the PatG was that compliance with European Union harmonization
efforts had to be reached. Section 11(2) of the 1981 PatG is derived
from the ratification of the Convention for the European Patent for the
105
Common Market (Gemeinschaftspatentübereinkommen) (CPC).
Article 31(b) exempts from liability for patent infringement all “acts
done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the
106
patented invention.” This provision was introduced almost verbatim
107
into most European national laws. “Of the original signatories of the
Community Patent Convention, The Federal Republic of Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, and Denmark have
amended their patent laws to essentially copy the provisions of the
108
Act.”
109
As
In Germany, the CPC rules became part of the 1981 PatG.
amended in 1981, they now provide that the effect of a patent should
not reach “acts for experimental purposes that relate to the subject
110
matter of the patented invention.” It should be noted that the present
PatG will soon be amended again, mainly because of Germany’s
obligation to implement the EC Biotechnology Directive into national
law. The draft of the Act for the Introduction of the Directive on the
111
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions does not, however,
provide for any alterations of the existing experimental use exemption;
thus, the present wording will remain unchanged.
C. Scope of Experimental Use Provision
The scope of § 11(2) of the PatG had been subject to discussion
among lower courts and scholars alike. The Landgericht Berlin, as
105. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 15, 1975,
BGBl. II, 833 (F.R.G.), 15 I.L.M. 5 (1976) [hereinafter CPC].
106. Id. at art. 31(b) (renumbered as art. 27(b) in Dec. 15, 1989 amendment).
107. Especially the Netherlands form an exception here, as the pertinent wording of
the Dutch Patent Law 1995, Article 53(3) reads as follows: “The exclusive right shall not
extend to acts solely serving for research on the patented subject-matter, including the
product obtained directly as a result of using the patented process.” See Cornish, supra note
11, at 736.
108. See Bruzzone, supra note 64, at 62 (footnotes omitted).
109. Patentgesetz [Patent Act], Dec. 18, 1980, BGBl. I, §§ 11(2) (F.R.G.)
110. This is a translation of the German wording, which reads as follows: “Die
Wirkung des Patents erstreckt sich nicht auf Handlungen zu Versuchszwecken, die sich auf
den Gegenstand der patentierten Erfindung beziehen.”
111. BTDrucks 14/5642.
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court of first instance, argued that § 11(2) is simply to be seen as a
113
codification of case law regarding the 1968 version of § 6; thus, the
principles stated under Part III.A. apply. However, the Federal
Supreme Court has taken a much more liberal approach in two
landmark decisions.
1. Federal Supreme Court, Clinical Trials I
114

In Clinical Trials I, the plaintiff was the exclusive licensee of a
patent that covered human immune interferon, the so-called interferon
115
gamma.
One of the defendants imported the active ingredient and
used it to produce “Polyferon,” a pharmaceutical approved by the
Federal Public Health Department for the treatment of chronic
116
polyarthritis, the classic rheumatoid arthritis.
He sold it to another
117
defendant who distributed the “Polyferon.” The defendants were
conducting clinical studies with the patented substance with a view to
118
identify additional, conceivable indications.
The Federal Supreme Court, in the words of Supreme Court Judge
Professor Dr. Meier-Beck, “rejected a recourse to the decisions made
under the Patent Act of 1968, including the ‘Ethofumesat’-decision . . . .
[Its] main considerations were the following: [§ 11(2)] had no
corresponding provision in the previous statutes, and the provision was
119
adopted almost verbatim from the Community Patent Convention.”
According to Judge Meier-Beck, this shows that the “German
legislative body [did not simply want] to codify existing national law and
120
jurisdiction.”
Therewith—as the Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of
Justice] says—the exempted tests were not defined positively but

112. Under German civil procedure rules, a Landgericht is court of first instance in all
civil actions exceeding 5000 Euro in value, and in special cases such as patent and trademark
actions. In all civil actions not exceeding 5000 Euro in value, the Landgericht sits as a Court
of Appeals.
113. Klinischer Test [Clinical Test], 1985 GRUR 375, 376 (LG Berlin).
114. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], July 11, 1995, 1996 GRUR
109, [1997] R.P.C. 623 (F.R.G.).
115. Id. at 109, [1997] R.P.C. at 629.
116. Id. at 110, [1997] R.P.C. at 630–31.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Peter Meier-Beck, Clinical Trials and the Patent Law’s Test Privilege, at 4,
http://www.italy.les-europe.org/docs/meier.pdf (lasted visited Jan. 21, 2005) (emphasis
added).
120. Id.
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a negative delimitation was given: Any activities are excluded
from test privilege which use an invention as the means for
experimental acts; in such cases the invention is no longer used
for purposes of experimentation.
....
Accordingly, the wording of [§ 11(2)] of the Patent Act and
the legislative speak for the assumption that clinical trials are
exempted (enjoy the test privilege) even when the patented
active substance is used with the objective of finding whether
and, where appropriate, with what form of administration and
dosage it is able to cure or alleviate certain human diseases.
These trials are exempted as a matter of principle, regardless
whether, beyond the pure research character of the trials,
economic interests are also in the background, which can anyway
121
hardly ever be ruled out.
Judge Meier-Beck also expressed his view that the Federal Supreme
Court’s decision in Clinical Trials I is in accord with the decision of the
122
British Court of Appeal in Monsanto.
“Therefor, [sic] the
admissibility of clinical tests is [not] barred by the [fact] that these test[s]
are typically carried out with the further objective of obtaining
123
[regulatory] approval.”
124
This decision was affirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), holding that the Federal Supreme Court’s
construction of § 11(2) did not violate the constitutional property
guarantee set out in Article 14 of the German Constitution
125
(Grundgesetz).
2. Federal Supreme Court, Clinical Trials II
126

In Clinical Tests II, the Federal Supreme Court was confronted
with the following fact pattern: clinical trials were performed with a
preparation containing recombinant human erythropoietin (EPO) to
confirm results obtained in animal tests and to generate data required
121. Id. at 4–5 (translation added).
122. [1985] R.P.C. 515, 1987 GRUR INT 108 (Eng.).
123. Meier-Beck, supra note 119, at 5.
124. Procedurally, what happened is called “nonacceptance of a constitutional
complaint” (“Nichtan-nahme einer Verfassungsbeschwerde”), which is similar to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s denial of a writ of certiorari.
125. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], May 10,
2000, 1 BvR 1864/95, 2001 NJW 1783.
126. Bundesgerichtoshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Apr. 17, 1997, 1997 NJW
3092, [1998] R.P.C. 423 (F.R.G.).
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for regulatory approval.
It welcomed the occasion to confirm its
holding in Clinical Test I:
As [§ 11(2) of the PatG] neither qualitatively nor quantitatively
limits the experimental activities . . . . According wording of the
law it is [not relevant whether the tests yield] scientifically or
commercially usable results, or whether the test of a protected
active agent achieves the aim of obtaining data of legal
pharmaceutical permission . . . . [The only requirement is that the
tests are intended to yield information related to the patented
subject matter.] . . . This is also the situation if—as in the case in
dispute—a pharmaceutical compound which contains the
protected active agent should be tested in a clinical experiment
with regards to its effectiveness and digestibility. [It is not
evident from the wording of the provision that it would exclude
an economical orientation or commercial objective of the
128
experimental conduct.]
The Federal Supreme Court did find, as it had not found in Clinical
Trials I, that the trials conducted solely for obtaining regulatory
approval do qualify for the experimental use exemption. “[T]he
plaintiff is not successfully able to validate a differentiation between
research activities which serve to develop further and improve an active
agent protected by patent and such activities which have as their
129
purpose the fulfilment of the regulations for authorisation.”
One may think that this is self-evident, because the German
provisions so far do extend beyond the scope of Hatch-Waxman Act.
But, at least prima facie, ambiguous messages in that respect still seem
to be sent by members of the Federal Supreme Court’s Tenth Senate.
Judge Meier-Beck posed the following questions:
This may really be the decisive question: Were the trials, apart
from other intentions, also aimed at exploring the unknown and
bringing out new facts or solving remaining uncertainties? If yes,
the test privilege is applicable. Or is demonstrating well-known
facts to the competent authority the sole intention of the tests?
If this is the case, the tests are not privileged trials in accordance
130
with [§ 11(2)] of the 1981 Patent Act.

127. Id. at 3092, [1998] R.P.C. at 427–30.
128. Id. at 3096, [1998] R.P.C. at 433.
129. Id. at 3095, [1998] R.P.C. at 436 (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court
of Justice], July 11, 1995, 1996 GRUR 109, [1997] R.P.C. 623 (F.R.G.)).
130. Meier-Beck, supra note 119, at 9.
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This view is shared by another prominent member of the Tenth Senate,
131
Judge Alfred Keukenschrijver.
The quotation above certainly raises questions as to the very idea of
generic manufacturing, the questions to which Judge Meier-Beck
provided a quite vague answer. “It is a question of fact which is the
right one of these categories for tests necessary to obtain regulatory
approval for a generic product. I do not dare to answer this, as I simply
132
lack sufficient expert knowledge on this field of technology.”
The aforementioned remarks are somewhat confusing and should be
clarified. Whenever a generic producer aims to design around a
patented product and uses the patented product to obtain regulatory
approval, he shall be exempt from infringement under German (and
U.S.) law. The Federal Supreme Court simply held that experiments
are not subject to the experimental use safe harbor if they serve solely
to verify business questions, such as whether there is a demand in the
133
market or an acceptance of price ranges or distribution channels.
The Federal Supreme Court certainly did not, and did not mean to,
exclude tests for obtaining regulatory approval, which have to be seen as
within the scope—if not at the heart—of § 11(2), even when they do not
reveal new facts. This approach is visible in the Landgericht’s holding in
Clinical Trials II.
The Landgericht, as a court of first instance, found that testing for
the purposes of regulatory marketing approval was not within the scope
of § 11(2), a point the Federal Supreme Court expressively dismissed as
discussed earlier.
Moreover, in Clinical Trials II, the Federal Supreme Court stated an
important difference between Clinical Trials I and II.
[In contrast to Clinical Trials I], it is here not a matter of the
discovery of further indications, rather of facts concerning the
characteristics of the active agent in accordance with the patent
in the context of the well-known indications. These experiments
134
are activities which are related to the object of the invention.

131. See Alfred Keukenschrijver, 2002 MITT. DT. PA. 2, 5 (2002).
132. Meier-Beck, supra note 119, at 9.
133. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Apr. 17, 1997, 1997
NJW 3092, 3094, [1998] R.P.C. 423, 433–34 (F.R.G.).
134. Id., [1998] R.P.C. at 431.
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IV. DEFINITION AND INTERPRETATION OF DIFFERENCES
A. Differences in Statutory Wording
Comparing the German and U.S. provisions, it becomes apparent
that each provision is both broader and narrower than the respective
other statute. In total, the U.S. provision contains the more detailed,
and, thus, much more restrictive approach.
The German provision only allows experiments relating to the
patented subject matter; the meaning of such a restriction will be
discussed later. Hatch-Waxman Act provides, in pertinent part, for no
such restriction, but requires experiments to reasonably relate to
regulatory admissions under federal law, which can be simplified by the
term “relating to FDA approval only.” This, of course, is a very severe
restriction that excludes testing in any respect not related to FDA
approval, leaving entire industrial branches with no need to obtain a “go
ahead” from the FDA. That being said, the only situation in which the
U.S. regulation would be broader than the German counterpart could
be an experiment required by the FDA but not relating to the patented
subject matter. Under a reasonable construction of the term “relate,”
this is a rather theoretical case. The U.S. regulation further excludes
new animal drugs and certain veterinary biological products, which are
135
described very precisely in the statute.
The PatG contains no
restriction regarding the eligible subject matter.
B. Evaluation of Differences
In Germany, the term “relate” enjoys a rather broad construction.
Shortly after § 11(2) was introduced, the majority of scholars and
practitioners read the statute in such a way that all experimental
conduct with patented subject matter was permissible and the limitation
“relating to the subject matter of the patented product” simply excluded
experiments if the aim of the tests was to obtain information about
marketability of the patented invention or in which the patented
136
compound was used as an “apparatus” to test something different.

135. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
136. See e.g., Peter Chrocziel, Die Bneutzung patentierter Erfindungen zu Versuchs-und
Forschungszwecken [Use of Patented Inventions for Experimental and Research Purposes],
1986 GRUR 148, 195. See also Rudolf Teschemacher, Biotechnologiche Erfindungen in der
Erteilungspraxis des Europäischen Patentamtes [Biological Inventions in the Prosecution
Practice of the European Patent Office], 1987 GRUR INT. 303, 303–10.
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An example for the latter “apparatus” test would be to use a
patented refrigerator in order to examine the effect of very low
temperatures on certain (other) products. An experiment relating to
the patented subject matter would be validly conducted when the
refrigerator is used in the same way, but in a way to see how efficiently
137
the refrigerator cools other products.
In the opinion of the author, this very fine (or, in a less positive
perception, artificial) delineation provokes misuse. As the above
example shows, impermissible and permissible action are just two sides
of the same process. On the other hand, those tests are not primarily
about simply obtaining information (that is, how efficiently can the
refrigerator cool my product). If the information is necessary for
authorities, then secretly obtained data does not help. Because test
results have to be submitted, the illegal conduct thereby will be
disclosed, which devalues the incentive for circumvention.
Although one may sometimes overestimate the differences between
civil and common law systems, courts are even less likely and less able
to introduce additional bars or requirements when facing somewhat
clear statutory language in civil law countries. That being said, the only
limitations of experimental use in Germany are those which can be
extracted from the wording of § 11(2). Because there is no such thing as
an additional common law experimental use and the statute does not
provide for a different treatment of commercially motivated
experiments, there is no difference between commercial and
noncommercial conduct under German patent law.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
It has been frequently said that comparisons without evaluation are
of limited value. A leading treatise on comparative law makes a valid
point in stating that the “comparatist’s power and duty to make a critical
evaluation [of the analysis, otherwise] comparative law can easily
degenerate into a dizzying spiral in which everything is both cause and
effect; different from, but similar to, anything else; separate but
138
intertwined.”
On the other hand, this should not lead the reader to believe that
there is a “winner” to be declared whose system has to be copied by the
“loser.” In the opinion of the author, the approach of a good
137. See as an example Gottfried Freier, Patentverletz-ung und Versuchsprivileg
[Patent Infringement and Experimental Use Exemption], 1987 GRUR 664, 666.
138. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 4, at 8.

RUESS - ARTICLE - FORMATTED

4/24/2006 6:51:43 AM

104 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1

comparison should be rather biblical—literally biblical if applying the
139
word of St. Paul: “Probe everything and retain the best.” So what is
“the best”? What has to be retained? That, of course, depends on the
aim that is pursued by the legislator. In the following discussion, the
author will show that the U.S. and the German legislator, although
prima facie developing solutions to the identical task of promoting “the
140
Progress of Science and Useful Arts,” were seeking to reach quite
different objectives.
As evident from the discussion above, the experimental use defense
is broader under German law than under U.S. law. There may be
several reasons why the compromise has been struck differently in the
United States than in Germany. The most apparent one is that the
benefit to the public is weighed differently. As Judge Rader stated in
the Integra, the Hatch-Waxman Act was “designed to benefit the
makers of generic drugs, research-based pharmaceutical companies, and
141
not incidentally the public.” Although the government’s interest in low
drug costs might well have played a role in the already discussed
reversal of this opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court, this does not change
the general approach. According to another opinion of the Federal
Circuit, “Congress struck a balance between two competing policy
interests: (1) inducing pioneering research and development of new
drugs and (2) enabling competitors to bring low-cost, generic copies of
142
those drugs to market.”
That being said, it is obvious that, under U.S. law, only two parties
and their interests had to be reconciled, and public factors are
143
considered as “secondary effects” only.
Whereas, in Germany, one
can make the argument that the public interest directly weighs in on the
side of the generic drug manufacturers.
Although there is no specific reference to the public good in the
statute, numerous scholars have elaborated on the public good as a

139. 1 Thessalonians 5:21.
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The German legislative aim is equivalent, yet not
codified on a constitutional level.
141. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(quoting Glaxo, Inc. v. Novapharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 162, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (emphasis
added).
142. Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., 324 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Andrx
Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added).
143. For a broader view on the role of public interest in patent cases with special focus
on the biotechnology sector, see Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public
Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389 (2002).
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factor to consider in construing the experimental use defense.
As
145
Professor Straus pointed out, the “legitimate interest of the public in
information relevant for improving medical care depends upon the
146
clinical testing.”
In this context, he described the interests of the
public and the interest of the applicant for the new patent as being “in
147
It is evident that, in developing a compromise between
accord.”
interests, the acknowledgement of a public good factor weighing in on
one side of the scale in German law left less room for the interests of the
patentees than under the U.S. system.
As the course of research revealed, the most significant factor is a
totally different approach of the legislature; Congress simply did not
want to create a general experimental use defense. Section 271(e)(1)
took a very specialized approach and simply aimed to overcome the
problem created (or, to be fair, visualized) by the Federal Circuit in
Roche. Scholars in this country have been criticizing this point of view
148
and argued in favor of a general experimental use exception; whereas
others argue that “an exception allowing experimental use of another
person’s invention should only be allowed if the overall social utility
149
increases.”
The German provision, on the other hand, explicitly represents a
general experimental use defense, as it is also known in Japan and most
150
European countries.
It covers experiments conducted with a
commercial motivation, allows research for not only existing and new
151
indications, and does not restrict clinical trials for regulatory approval.

144. See, e.g., Jochen Pagenberg, Das Versuchsprivileg des § 11 Nr. 2 PatG [The
Experimental Use Exemption in § 11(2) of the Patent Act], 1996 GRUR 736; Hieber, supra
note 99, at 445; Joseph Straus, Zur Zulaessigkeit klinischer Untersuchungen am Gegenstand
abhaengiger Verbesserungserfindungen [To the Admissibility of Clinical Trials with Dependent
Improvement Inventions], 1993 GRUR 308, 318.
145. Straus, supra note 144, at 318.
146. Professor Straus’ strong emphasis on public good has recently been criticized by
Rolf Pietzcker, who argues for stronger patent protection and narrow construction of § 11(2).
Rolf Pietzcker, Patentrechtliche Fragen bei klinischen Untersuchungen–eine Erwiderung
[Questions of Patent Law With Regard to Clinical Trials—A Rebuttal], 1994 GRUR 319. The
details of that controversy are beyond the scope of this Article, as Dr. Pietzcker does not
generally oppose the public good as a factor for balancing interests.
147. See Straus, supra note 144, at 318.
148. See Bruzzone, supra note 64, at 52.
149. See Walters, supra note 24, at 522.
150. For a discussion of foreign provisions, see Bruzzone, supra note 64, at 61–62.
151. See Martin Faehndrich & Winfried Tilmann, Patentnutzende
Bereitstellungshandlungen bei Versuchen [Supply Activities Using the Patented Invention in
Experiments], 2001 GRUR 901.
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Its only limitations are that no purely market-oriented research
(distribution, marketing, pricing) is covered and that the patented
invention must not be an apparatus for the invention, but the object of
those.
So what, to refer back to St. Paul, is the “best” which is to be
retained? Should scholars and practitioners pursue the broader concept
(Germany) or stick to the narrower construction (U.S.)? And, in this
context, will or should the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari
in Integra, uphold the present, narrow rules established under Federal
Circuit law? An indication for a liberalization of present law can be
seen in the grant of certiorari as such. The fact that the government in
its amicus brief decided to weigh in against the Federal Circuit is an
even stronger sign that some parameters might be shifted.
In this context, it is also worthwhile remembering that amendments
to the Hatch-Waxman Act’s experimental use exception have been
suggested only a few years after the provision was signed into law. In
1988, the American Bar Association Patent, Trademark & Copyright
Committee passed a resolution favoring “in principle an exemption
from infringement for activities conducted solely for experimental or
152
research purposes, not limited to pharmaceutical products.”
In the same year, an act was introduced into the House of
Representatives by then Representative Kastenmeier stating the
following:
[I]t would appear desirable to codify a coherent set of principles
to guide conduct in this area. Congress should . . . amend title 35
to provide that the use of a patented invention or process is not
an act of infringement if done for the purpose of
experimentation and research. This requirement should not
153
apply only to biotechnology but . . . to all patented inventions.
In the author’s view, the European provisions and the amendments
advanced by the Committee and Representative Kastenmeier suggest
that there are several good reasons for a broader (yet certainly not
infinite) experimental use exception. Because dependent inventions
cannot be “disconnected” from the prior patents in their commercial use

152. Bruzzone, supra note 64, at 66 (paraphrasing The A.B.A. Patent, Trademark &
Copyright Comm. Rep. Resolution 101-4, 1988 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT L. REP. 25).
153. Id. at 66–67 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-888 (1998)).

RUESS - ARTICLE - FORMATTED

2006]

4/24/2006 6:51:43 AM

ACCEPTING EXCEPTIONS?

107
154

and because earlier inventors will still be adequately compensated, the
policy considerations on which patent law is founded seem to suggest
155
that a broader research exception will further the overall good. The
value of a comparison is to show that a broader exception, in Germany
as in many countries in the world, actually works without patentees
having to fear a near-Marxist system obligating them to surrender
intellectual property rights for some vague society benefit. In fact,
Representative Kastenmeier referred, inter alia, to a German source
156
when suggesting his modifications.
Moreover, these comparisons
reveal that “[t]he lack of a codified experimental use provision in the
157
United States stands in sharp contrast to the rest of the world,” which
is, of course, not sufficient to say that the U.S. system is in need of
improvement.
Of course, patent owner’s interests have to be safeguarded
appropriately. Thus, the author would not subscribe to the idea of a
“fair use” idea in patent law—that is, allowing infringement whenever it
158
is somehow socially beneficial.
This Article also should not lead to the conclusion that the Federal
Circuit was absolutely incorrect in Integra. In fact, legislative history
and the wording of the statute seem more likely to support a narrow
construction. The U.S. Supremee Court has, as mentioned above,
159
referred to the exemption as “clinical trials exemption” in Eli Lilly,
yet at the same time it emphasized that there is no limitation to clinical
160
trials. In light of the ambiguities, it should have been the domain of
Congress to open up the scope of Hatch-Waxman Act and to precisely
define the limits. Instead, it has been felt obligated to act without
precisely defining the limits.

154. The author acknowledges that this is a subjective term and appreciates the
problem connected with it. One could thus make an argument against that as well, which
would be equally subjective; however, this is a problem implicit in most judgment calls.
155. Again, this is a subjective term depending on what a society defines as overall
good.
156. H.R. REP. NO. 100-888, at 51 (citing P. CHROCZIEL, DIE BENUTZIND
PATENTIERER ERFINDUNGEN ZU VERSUCHS—UND FORSCHUNGSZWECKKN 174 (1986)).
157. See Christina Weschler, The Informal Experimental Use Exception: University
Research After Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536, 1539 (2004).
158. This is advocated by Maureen O’Rourke in Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1201 (2000).
159. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronics, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990) (emphasis
added).
160. See Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380–84 (2005).
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The effects of the Integra decision, however, are not unwelcome in
light of policy considerations and differing standards abroad. The U.S.
Supreme Court may well have (deliberately or not) complied with what
some scholars have long since demanded:
To prevent the export of research to countries more “friendly” to
reverse engineering, to avoid a chilling of research by the current
state of confusion, and to encourage trade through a harmonized
worldwide patent system, it is in the interest of the United States
to resolve the current confusion and enact a research exemption .
161
...
Time will tell whether the U.S. Supreme Court promoted or chilled
research by its latest opinion. Monitoring how courts and Congress will
proceed in the field of experimental use after Integra will remain an
interesting and rewarding task. Reverting to the beginning of this
Article, there is a final argument to be made for the use of international
comparative law. International comparisons can, especially in highly
specialized fields of international business like patent law, contribute
significantly by showing alternatives, evaluating strengths and
weaknesses of domestic and foreign approaches, providing material to
reconsider legislative targets, and, finally, even by furthering
harmonization of legal systems.
There is already evidence of this harmonization within the European
162
Union in Article 10(6) of Directive 2004/27, in which the European
Union enacted a new provision commonly referred to as the “RocheBolar clause.” The provision reads as follows:
Conducting the necessary studies and trials with a view to the
application of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 [i.e. the abbreviated
procedure for obtaining market approval for generic medicinal
products] and the consequential practical requirements shall not
be regarded as contrary to patent rights or to supplementary
163
protection certificates for medicinal products.
The German legislature has already reacted and added § 11(2)(b) to
the PatG, which is slightly different as it does not imply the requirement
of an abridged procedure, but generally allows experimental use

161. Bruzzone, supra note 64, at 69.
162. See Council Directive 2004/27, 2004 O.J. (L136) (EC) (amending Council
Directive 2001/83, 2001 O.J. (L 311) (EC)).
163. Id.
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164

activities for obtaining market approval.
This is in line with the
Federal Supreme Court’s decision in Clinical Trials II.
The Federal Supreme Court decision and the Roche-Bolar clause
thus “work together” to narrow the “transatlantic gap” between U.S.
and German patent law, however positive or negative one might judge
165
this to be.

164. Frank-Erich Hufnagel & Peter Ruess, Neues zum Versuchsprivileg im USPatentrecht—Gedanken zur Entscheidung des US Supreme Court in Merck v. Integra, [News
on Experimental Use in U.S. Patent Law—Thoughts on the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in
Merck v. Integra], 2005 MITT. DT. PA. 497, 502 (2005).
165. Id.
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APPENDIX: OVERVIEW CHART
U.S. Patent Law
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).

Statutory
Wording

Subject
Matter
Covered

Nature of
Experiment
(emphasis
added)

German Patent Law
Patentgesetz, Dec. 18,
1980, BGBl. (F.R.G.).
It shall not be an act of
Die Wirkung des
infringement to make, use, offer
Patents erstreckt sich
to sell, or sell within the United nicht auf Handlungen
States or import into the United zu Versuchszwecken,
States a patented invention (other die sich auf den
than a new animal drug or
Gegenstand der
veterinary biological product (as patentierten Erfindung
those terms are used in the
beziehen.
Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and the Act of
[The effect of the
March 4, 1913) which is primarily patent does not reach
manufactured using recombinant out to acts for
DNA, recombinant RNA,
experimental purposes
hybridoma technology, or other
which relate to the
processes involving site specific
subject matter of the
genetic manipulation techniques) patented invention.]
solely for uses reasonably related
to the development and
submission of information under
a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs
or veterinary biological products.
All, except new animal drugs
certain veterinary biological
products
But, restrictions implied due to
nature of experiment
Solely
for uses reasonably related
to Federal regulatory approval

All

Solely
for purposes related
to subject matter of
invention

